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National Movements in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires

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Abstract and Keywords

The development towards modern nation-states in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires proceeded as a series of national movements acting on behalf of subordinate ethnic communities and seeking the attributes of a fully fledged nation. These movements had three main aims: the development of national culture based on the local language, the achievement of some degree of political rights and self-administration, and the formation of a full social structure of equal citizens. Differences between the empires were important in shaping the specificity of singular national movements. We can distinguish national movements which began with linguistic and cultural goals from those in the Balkans which gave priority to the political goals. The cultural movements are highly diverse while the political movements belong to a rather homogeneous type of 'secessionist nationalism'. The chronology of national movements varied with some starting at the end of the eighteenth century, some in the first half of the nineteenth century, and some even later.

Keywords: National movement, ethnic group, Ottoman Empire, Habsburg (Austrian) Empire, cultural nationalism, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Croatians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Montenegrins, Magyars, Rumanians

Background: The Two Empires

IN central and south-east Europe the path from pre-modern empire to modern nation state took two basic forms. The first involved struggles for the unification of politically divided national communities that already possessed well-established cultural traditions and a

national language as well as a full social structure. This was the case with German, Italian, and Polish ‘unification nationalism’.[1]

The second involved national movements acting on behalf of subordinate ethnic groups and seeking to achieve all the attributes of a fully fledged nation. It is this form of nationalism that will be analysed in this chapter. These movements had three main aims: the development of a national culture based on the local language; the achievement of some degree of political rights and self-administration (not necessarily an independent state); the formation of a full social structure of equal citizens from its own ethnic group. The precise way in which these aims were pursued varied from case to case.

Such national movements operated in both the Habsburg lands (after 1804 the Austrian Empire) and the Ottoman Empire. In the Austrian Empire the German language dominated administration and public life, but ethnic Germans constituted only a small minority within the population. The remainder of the population was made up of various ethnic groups (Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croatians) as well as ethnic minorities whose core territory was located outside the empire (Serbians, Romanians, Italians, Poles, Ruthenes).[2] The table below provides estimates of the size of various ethnic groups within the Habsburg Empire.

(p. 176) The dominant group in the European part of the Ottoman Empire were the Turkish- speaking Muslims. Much of the population consisted of Christian ethnic groups, like Greeks, Serbians, Romanians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Albanians, as well as Slavic-speaking Muslims (Bosniaks).

Nationality	1850–1	%	1910	%
Germans	6.3 mill.	28.6	9.9 mill.	26.7
Magyars	5.0 mill.	22.7	10.1 mill.	27.3
Poles	2.0 mill.	9.1	4.9 mill.	13.2
Czechs	4.1 mill.	18.6	6.4 mill.	17.3
Croatians	1.6 mill.	7.3	2.4 mill.	6.5
Slovenes	1.1 mill.	5.0	1.2 mill.	3.5
Slovaks	1.8 mill.	6.8	2.0 mill.	5.4

Political, social, and cultural conditions in these two empires differed in many respects and these were important in shaping specific national movements. One major difference concerned how the two empires were established. The Habsburg dynasty had expanded since the late Middle Ages by combining dynastic claims, diplomatic treaties, and the threat or actual use of military force. Their rule in almost all their lands was based on contracts and conventions with local elites who pledged loyalty to the dynasty and empire. Insofar as national movements could identify themselves with specific historical lands (and hence with 'national histories' linked to those lands), they could formulate demands in terms of their violated constitutions, lost historical rights and traditions. Consequently, their claims could be presented in terms of a different interpretation of historical rights from that of the dynasty, sometimes backed up by mass demonstrations. Extensive violence was limited to the revolutions of 1848, although these were less concerned with national aims than with the removal of political oppression by the old regime.

By contrast, the Ottoman Empire was formed by conquest and force, and the new rulers continued to display their military supremacy over the following centuries. In most cases, they destroyed pre-existing state institutions and the local nobility within the conquered territory. National claims therefore could not base themselves on old rights or agreements and their success depended rather on the whims of local or central Ottoman authorities.

A second important difference concerns the role of religion. The Ottoman conquerors accentuated their superiority by emphasizing the supremacy of Islam. However, they did not aim at general conversion to Islam; indeed, they maintained religious barriers dividing Muslims from non-Muslims. This division provided the Christian population with the opportunity to create separate institutions. National movements (except Albanians and Bosniaks) defined themselves and their enemies in terms of confessional difference. As a consequence, the clergy always played an important role in national movements.

(p. 177) By contrast, Habsburg support for the Counter-Reformation achieved a good deal of confessional homogenization throughout the empire. This meant that in most cases national movements could not use religious difference as the basis for national mobilization. However, the Catholic Church was usually organized in relation to the historical lands that gave a national dimension to the clergy. Confessional differences—or the memory of such differences—could play a part in national struggles, but this was a secondary element.

Third, in economic terms, the key difference was that capitalism and industrialization started much earlier in central Europe than in the Balkans. Consequently, both forms of production and social structures in the Ottoman Empire were pre-modern with strong traces of patriarchalism and privileged social relations. Differences in economic and commercial growth related to differences in the intensity of social communication.

Fourth, since the Enlightenment had already penetrated into central Europe by the mid-eighteenth century, there was a strong tradition of scientific research on the history, language, habits, and characteristics of ethnic groups in the Habsburg Empire. This in turn promoted the cultivation of national identity within these groups. By contrast, in the Ottoman Empire, higher secular education was very weak. Most scholarly research on ethnic groups was conducted abroad, partly by members of the Christian ethnic groups, partly by foreign—French, British, German—scholars.

Consequently, the early national movements in central Europe had clearly defined ideas of the nation. They knew (or believed they knew) who were Czechs, Magyars, Slovenes, et cetera, and what were the forms taken by their language, culture, and history. In the Balkans, the understanding of ethnic groups and their pasts was more often based on myths, interpreted by misunderstandings and modified by power policy. These provided conditions for nationalists making overlapping claims and often engaging in aggressive conflicts of interests in the Balkans.

Fifth, basic differences in education in the two empires have their roots in the medieval period. While the central European secular educational system developed into a sophisticated hierarchy of village elementary schools, higher urban schools, and universities, the Ottoman Empire only possessed religious schools. Relics of higher education survived from Byzantine times but they were also concerned with religious matters and their language of education was exclusively Greek. A small number of wealthy Christians had been studying abroad since the end of the eighteenth century, but the general rate of literacy—both Christian and Muslim—was much lower than in central Europe.

Sixth, the different position of the two empires in the system of international relations, and how they were regarded by ‘public opinion’ within the other major states, influenced how national movements and secessionist nationalism were utilized in foreign policy. While national movements inside Austria were—at least at first—largely ignored by the other powers, national movements in the Ottoman Empire quickly provided welcome pretexts for diplomatic and military interventions.

(p. 178) All these differences between the two empires shaped the various claims and methods of national movements and their outcomes. Furthermore, if and when national movements aimed to achieve power, they put less emphasis on cultural and social demands and instead stressed political demands, even extending to secessionism.

The Magyars

In 1526 the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, which included also the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia and the Great Duchy of Transylvania, became, through a dynastic marriage, part of the Habsburg domains. At this time, eastern and central Europe were endangered

by Ottoman expansion. Core territories of the Kingdom of Hungary were, until the end of the seventeenth century, occupied by the Ottomans. Transylvania fell under Ottoman 'protection'. By exploiting this situation, the Hungarian nobility successfully resisted Habsburg centralism as well as the Counter-Reformation until the eighteenth century. Hungary remained an autonomous part of the Habsburg Empire.

Hungary was a multi-ethnic territory, where Magyar speakers made up the largest group but nowhere near the majority of the population, which included Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Germans, Romanians, Jews, and Ruthenes (see the table on p. 176). Such ethnic diversity did not necessarily create problems, since Latin was, until the end of the eighteenth century, the exclusive language of public life, administration, and education. The majority of the numerous nobility, however, was Magyar speaking and it retained a strong political consciousness of being the privileged 'Natio Hungarica'. The Hungarian Diet, accessible exclusively to nobles, protected the Kingdom's autonomy. With some aristocratic support, enlightened scholars from the mid-eighteenth century began to study the history of the Kingdom, the ethnography of its inhabitants, as well as to celebrate and modernize the written form of the Magyar.

The Hungarian nobility openly opposed the enlightened rationalist reforms introduced by Joseph II in the 1780s. They rejected the abolition of serfdom and protested against the replacement of Latin by German in administration and schools. A growing number of lower nobility proposed replacing both Latin and German by their Magyar mother tongue. Even though the Diet did not succeed in most points, the conflict strengthened the coherence of the nobility and stimulated its search for a new identity. Step by step, the opposition of Estates used national rhetoric and gave up the exclusive aristocratic concept of the 'Natio'. As a result, the early national movement was dominated by the nobility and its programme combined old historical political demands for Hungarian state rights with new demands in favour of Magyar language and culture. This interconnection was demonstrated during the 'reform diet' of 1827, when the introduction of the Magyar language into all spheres of life was advocated and a new concept of the nation formulated. The most influential spokesman of this concept was one of the richest magnates, Stephen Szechényi, who regarded the Magyar (p. 179) nation as a community of citizens irrespective of birth or property. In order to make a reality of this nation, Szechényi recommended reforms of the relationship between landlords and peasants, including the abolition of seigneurial privileges. He believed that defence of political autonomy required such reforms and that these concessions would not undermine the economic position of nobles. Most Magyar patriots were of noble origin, even though many of them owned no land and supported themselves as members of the free professions and government officials.

In the two decades following the Diet of 1827, Magyar national agitation made important progress, above all among the nobility and the urban population. The Magyar language was introduced into the schools. Magyar poetry and literature achieved important goals and there were publications in Magyar in the humanities and sciences, supported by the well-funded Hungarian Academy of Sciences. During the 1840s a new generation of

Magyar intellectuals developed a liberal programme aiming at the emancipation of the Hungarian political nation, which was understood to include both Magyars and non-Magyar-speaking inhabitants of the Kingdom. However, this idea was rejected by the other nationalities in Hungary with the possible exception of Jews.

This disagreement between Magyars and non-Magyars played an important role during the revolution of 1848, when Magyar political leadership took advantage of the breakdown of the Metternich regime and as early as April announced important reforms such as the abolition of labour services and the integration of Transylvania into the rest of the Kingdom. These ‘April Laws’ were the first step towards a constitutional state that would enjoy a great deal of autonomy in the form of personal unions under Habsburg rule. The Magyar political leadership envisaged a centralized nation state with Magyar as the official language. This provoked strong opposition among those non-Magyar groups in which national movements had already started to form, such as the Croatians, Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks. Once the government in Vienna had survived the political crisis of spring 1848, it could exploit these national movements—above all, those of Croatians—to support military action against Magyar revolution. Further Magyar military successes over the following year led the Austrian emperor to request military help from the Russian tsar. The defeated Magyar revolutionaries were persecuted in the ensuing counter-revolution.

Nevertheless, Magyar national mobilization was strong enough to survive Austrian oppression during the 1850s. As soon as Austria introduced constitutional reforms from about 1860, Magyar liberals again took up their struggle for an autonomous Hungarian state, only this time aiming to attain their goal by negotiation, not revolution. Under the leadership of Ferenc Deak, they were able to exploit Austrian weakness following its defeat by Prussia in the war of 1866 to achieve the so-called Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867. The state was transformed into a dual monarchy—Austria-Hungary. In effect, Magyars had achieved statehood. The major drawback was that they regarded all inhabitants of historical Hungary (except Croatians), whatever their language, as members of one political Hungarian nation. In pursuit of this goal, the Hungarian government soon embarked on a policy of Magyarization that provoked (p. 180) further serious internal conflicts. However, the bulk of the Magyar political elite after the Compromise gradually came to feel a genuine loyalty towards the Monarchy, which they strongly supported until the end of the First World War.

The Czechs

The formation of a Czech national movement was a process concentrated on the territory of the formerly independent medieval Kingdom of Bohemia. As a result of dynastic policy, in the fourteenth century Bohemia had fallen under Habsburg rule, along with Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia, which together were known as the ‘Lands of the Crown of Bohemia’. Czech culture flourished in the sixteenth century, including a rich literature. Tension between the Protestant majority represented in the Estates and the Catholic Habsburg rulers resulted in rebellion that was defeated in 1620. It was followed by severe repression. Leading politicians and intellectuals were sentenced to death or forced into exile; the dominant Czech language in cultural and public life and administration was steadily replaced by German; the country was forcibly converted to Catholicism; its autonomy was undermined and later virtually abolished.

From the last third of the eighteenth century, enlightenment scholars began researching the history of Bohemia, the Czech language (still spoken by two thirds of inhabitants—peasants, artisans, the lower urban classes), and Czech literature from before 1620. This research received support from aristocrats as well as part of the Catholic hierarchy, motivated by a shared opposition to the far-reaching social, administrative, and religious reforms introduced by Joseph II. By contrast, most members of the Bohemian and Moravian Estates, being German speakers or bilingual, were not greatly upset by the Germanization of the administration and school system.

Important changes resulting from these reforms, together with what they heard about the French Revolution (although this was condemned by the authorities), motivated some young intellectuals of artisan and peasant origins to search for a new identity in the nation, understood as the community of all Czech-speaking inhabitants, irrespective of birth or position. In their view, confirmed by personal experience, Czech-speaking members of the lower classes were disadvantaged by their lack of knowledge of German. From the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Czech activists began agitating in the name of the nation-to-be, trying to persuade their co-nationals to accept Czech national identity based on common language and shared destiny, while also urging the Austrian authorities to permit Czech to be used as a language of higher education and public life. Even though this demand remained unfulfilled until 1848, Czech activists were allowed to publish in their language non-political texts except those deemed to be incompatible with Catholicism and state absolutism.

The first success for such agitation came in 1818 with the founding of the ‘Patriotic Museum’ and its journal in 1827, the first scientific journal written in Czech. During the (p. 181) 1830s, other journals appeared and it was possible to print scientific works with financial support based on collections organized by the ‘Czech Matice’.[3]

In the 1840s a new Czech-speaking elite developed and national agitation succeeded in gaining an audience within the urban lower middle classes. The aims of the Czech social programme included peasant emancipation and improvements in the training of craftsmen. An extension of the programme to political goals was first formulated in March 1848. This programme was addressed to the government in Vienna and accepted by both German- and Czech-speaking liberals. It demanded above all civil and constitutional rights and, as an integral element of these, equal rights for the use of the Czech language. Since Bohemia and Moravia belonged to the German Confederation, Czechs were invited to participate in elections to the German National Assembly, but there was a successful boycott. This started a split between Czechs and an increasing portion of the German-speaking population of Bohemia and Moravia who identified themselves with the German nation. The counter-proposal of a federal Austrian constitution (part of what was known as the Austroslav programme), which was supported by Czech representatives, failed in the face of absolutist centralization implemented during the counter-revolution.

The constitutional regime after 1860 created the opportunity for national mobilization. Czechs won in municipal elections in Prague and many Czech-speaking towns but were unable to achieve a majority in the Bohemian Diet because the electoral system favoured the nobility and industrialists who generally rejected Czech identity. In response, the Czech political programme was extended to include demands for autonomy based on the historical rights of Bohemia and Moravia, and for democratization (universal suffrage) that could secure political power based on the support of the Czech majority.

The Czech national movement achieved mass support, demonstrated above all in the wave of meetings called to protest against the *Ausgleich* of 1867. Czech politicians demanded the same political status as had been granted to the Magyars. In the world of everyday politics the Czech national movement made progress in various cultural, social, and linguistic matters. Prague University, which had been exclusively German speaking, was divided into a Czech and a German university. New Czech high schools were founded. There was industrialization in Czech-speaking areas. The use of the Czech language in state administration was enlarged, although it did not achieve full parity with German.

Assertion of Czech identity in Moravia, an autonomous part of the historical lands of the Crown of Bohemia, only gained mass support some two or three decades later than in Bohemia. By the end of the nineteenth century, Czech speakers constituted a fully formed social structure, with its own middle classes and educated elites.

Until 1914 the ultimate political goal of the Czech national movement was autonomy within the Monarchy. No significant national political group sought secession and an independent nation state. However, during the First World War, an increasing number of Czech politicians came to view dynastic ties to the empire as obsolete and supported the secessionist program of Czech émigrés, led by T. G. Masaryk. Following the defeat

(p. 182) of Austria and the end of the war in 1918, these politicians persuaded the Entente powers to permit the birth of a new state—Czechoslovakia.[4]

The Slovaks

The Slavic-speaking inhabitants of northern Hungary were descendants of a local population dating from the time before the Magyar invasion of 900. This population had no political autonomy and the only broader cultural contacts made in the late medieval and early modern periods were those with Czechs in Moravia and Bohemia. While German speakers in Hungary accepted the Lutheran Reformation from Germany, Slovak speakers were inspired by the Czech Reformation. The Protestant minority of Slovaks used Czech into the nineteenth century—which all Slovaks could understand—as their language of liturgy and education. Consequently, a complicated combination of identities emerged in the eighteenth century: educated Slovak speakers regarded themselves politically as Hungarians, but at the same time as ethnic Slovaks (or Slavs) and—in the case of Protestants—as participants in Czech cultural life.

As long as Latin was the official language in Hungary, ethnic identity did not play an important role. The situation changed in the 1780s when a group of Slovak Catholic clergymen, stimulated by Magyar opposition to Germanization, chose the West Slovak dialect as the basis for constructing a written form of Slovak. Printed texts in this language were published up to the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, Slovak Protestants, above all pastors, used Czech in their printed texts. Young Slovak intellectuals in the 1830s regarded this split as dangerous for the future of their ethnic community. Over the next decade, they constructed—under the leadership of a Protestant, Ludovit Štúr—a new linguistic norm based on dialects from central Slovakia and established a national movement to agitate for the use of this distinctive language, regarded as a guarantee of national identity. However, most Czech intellectuals, who considered Slovaks to be part of the Czech nation, refused to accept this Slovak ‘separation’.

During the revolution of 1848 Slovak patriots tried to mobilize popular support for the struggle against Magyarization, but with little success. Initial successes for the national movement were only registered from the beginning of the 1860s, when constitutional reforms allowed the foundation of Matice Slovenská, which acted as a centre for Slovak national agitation and provided support for the publication of books in the Slovak language. National demands were limited to language issues and a measure of autonomy for Slovak culture, and the national movement began to receive more support, as demonstrated in petitions and meetings. The Slovak language was introduced into elementary schools and even into three high schools (*Gymnasien*).

However, these small successes were annihilated after 1867, when the politics of Magyarization started. The Slovak language disappeared from public life and most schools, and national agitation was forbidden. Slovak culture was allowed only in the (p. 183) forms of non-political poetry and fiction. The only way to receive a non-Magyar higher education was in the seminaries for Catholic priests. The small group of secular Slovak intellectuals were mainly educated in Prague, where they collaborated closely with Czechs, often expressing overlapping Slovak and Czechoslovak (usually called 'Czechoslavic') identities. Thus, the concept of one Czechoslovak nation can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth century. This concept of one nation with an accepted Slovak variant of the Czechoslovak language would provide the official legitimation of the new state of Czechoslovakia. Between the two World Wars, this concept was implemented in the schools with the support of a majority of Slovak voters. It was opposed by the Slovak Peoples Party, led by Catholic priests, who mobilized a strong minority of Slovak voters in support of a concept of the Slovak nation. Following the destruction of independent Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany in 1939, this party declared an 'independent' Slovak nation state, allied to Germany. The new Republic in 1945 was organized as a state of two nations—Czechs and Slovaks—opening the way for the promotion of a genuine Slovak national culture.

The Slovenes

In the late medieval period, the Habsburg lands in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola were inhabited by Slavic as well as German speakers. The Slavic speakers were concentrated in the countryside, a minority in Styria and Carinthia, and a majority in Carniola.

Even though they had no common name, one of the Slovene dialects was used during the Reformation as the basis for a translation of the Bible and other religious texts. This dialect could be understood by all Slavic groups in the eastern Alps, including those who lived in the territories of the Veneto and Trieste.

At the end of the eighteenth century, enlightenment scholars, historians, and philologists concluded that all these dialects were components of one single language, and consequently, that all speakers of these dialects had been a nation already in the medieval period. They invented a name for these speakers —Slovenes—and published a Slovene dictionary and grammar. During the short existence of the 'Illyrian Provinces', created by Napoleon after his military triumph over Austria in 1809, almost all speakers of Slovene dialects lived under one unified administration.[5] This promoted the formation of a Slovene ethnic identity.

However, the path to modern national identity was complicated after 1830 by the new and attractive concept of 'Illyrism' formulated by the Croatian Ludovit Gaj. He regarded all southern Slavic dialects as similar and proposed there be one common language, arguing that Slovenes, Croatians, Bosniaks, and Serbs were all members of one 'Illyrian

nation’. After some disputes, Slovene intellectuals rejected Illyrism (only Gaj’s orthography was accepted) and formulated instead the cultural concept of a ‘unified’ Slovene nation. In the name of this nation, they sought unsuccessfully during the revolution of 1848 to bring all Slovenes into one administrative unit under (p. 184) Habsburg rule. However, this early national agitation was complicated by a split between the majority of conservative patriots (represented above all by Catholic clergy in the countryside) and liberals. A unified national program that commanded support from both streams was only devised in 1865.

In the new constitutional context of the 1860s, national agitation achieved its first successes. Slovene parties gained a majority in the Diet in Carniola in 1867. By the end of the 1860s, thousands of citizens—partly due to the influence of the Czech example—participated in protest meetings against the *Ausgleich* of 1867. In the 1870s the national movement had to confront an accelerating policy of Germanization, especially in Carinthia and Styria. Its leadership temporarily gave up the aim of a unified Slovenia but successfully achieved more limited goals in the fields of cultural and school policy. As a result of economic prosperity, a stronger Slovene urban middle class developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century, above all in Carniola and its capital Ljubljana, which became centres of a mass national movement.

Slovenes were, however, not strong enough to pursue an independent political programme during the First World War, and the post-war arrangements were decided by negotiations between the Entente powers and Serbia. Slovene-speaking regions of Carniola and southern Styria were included as an acknowledged nation in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes. The Slovenes in Gorica, Istria, and Trieste remained under Italian rule and those in Carinthia under Austrian rule, where they subsequently became a target for a strong and successful Germanization.

Even though the oppressive Serbian policy did not allow Slovenes to play any important role in political life, their national culture and economy grew significantly in the interwar period. Slovenia became the highest developed part of Yugoslavia, as the state was renamed in 1930. This prosperity was then interrupted during the Second World War.

The Croatians

Eighteenth-century Croatia was a small remnant of the medieval kingdom (Croatia proper, Slavonia, Dalmatia) that was unified in 1102 in the form of a personal union with Hungary. One of its three parts, Dalmatia, was lost to Venice at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and in the seventeenth century almost half of the remaining territory of Slovenia and of Croatia proper was turned into a ‘military border’ region designed to provide a defence against Ottoman attacks. The military border regions were governed directly from Vienna by the army and were settled by immigrants fleeing Ottoman territories. The Orthodox among these settlers were identified as Serbs. The resistance of

the Croatian Estates to this division of their territory was defeated by the end of the seventeenth century and punished by the confiscation of the most important landholdings. With only a weak sense of political or ethnic identity the Croatian Diet in 1790 voluntarily accepted the ‘protection’ of the Hungarian Estates (p. 185) and supported them in their struggle against the reforms introduced by Joseph II. This included opposition to the official use of the German language. In the Croatian Diet, Latin continued to be used as the official language until 1830. Then the Diet approved the Hungarian decision to introduce the Magyar language into Croatian schools.

The linguistic situation in Croatian territories was complicated by the fact that its population used dialects that belonged to two different groups. ‘Kai’ dialect was spoken around the capital Zagreb and had possessed a written form since the time of Renaissance humanism. Other Croatians used a vernacular belonging to the ‘Što’ dialects, which were spoken also by inhabitants of Bosnia and Serbia. Since in the eyes of Romantic patriots a single language formed the basis of a nation, a group of Croatian intellectuals led by Ludovit Gaj decided to codify a common literary language based on ‘Što’ dialects, regarding this language as that of one potentially united ‘Illyric nation’, which would include not only Croatians but also Slovenes and Serbs. However, this project failed. Later the project became counter-productive when Serbian politicians used it in support of their vision of a ‘Great-Serbian’ nation, which would include all ‘Što’ speakers, including Bosnians and some Croatians. In the 1850s moderate intellectuals from both sides formally came to a compromise, accepting the idea of one Serbo-Croat language to be used by these two nations, albeit with two different alphabets, Latin for Croatians and Cyrillic for Serbs.

Despite these differences, the Croatian national movement took its first significant steps in the 1840s. The first journals were published, Illyrian (later Croatian) *Matice* were founded to support literary and scientific life. A Croatian ‘national party’ was informally constructed with these campaigns and became a leading political force in the 1848 revolution. Its programme included civil rights and national aims, above all, unification with Dalmatia and abolition of the military border regions in order to form an autonomous state with Croatian as the language of administration and education. Even though Croatian troops supported Vienna in its war against the Magyar revolution, Croatian national demands remained unfulfilled. After the failure of the revolution, Magyarization in Croatia was replaced by Germanization. Croatia continued to be an economically underdeveloped region.

With the introduction of constitutionalism in the 1860s, the Croatian national movement resumed its activity, although the national idea had only a weak reception at mass level. Croatian politics was divided into three streams: the pro-Hungarian ‘Magyarons’, represented above all by the nobility; the National Party, which maintained the idea of South-Slavic cooperation; the movement (later party) of ‘historical right’, which demanded the unification of all the territories of the medieval Croatian kingdom. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867, Croatians achieved under the leadership of the National Party recognition as a ‘political nation’ and some degree of autonomy, including the military

border that was regained in 1881. While the National Party included an idealistic Yugoslav wing, the Party of Rights focused on ‘national interests’, including both a radical anti-Serbian policy and the struggle for peasant interests against Magyarized landlords. This political orientation became stronger in the last (p. 186) two decades of the nineteenth century. Some radicals from its ranks developed the Greater-Croatia idea, claiming the inclusion of Bosnia into their national territory.

After the defeat and breakup of the empire, Croatia was included within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes, even though many, probably most, Croatian politicians opposed this. In the weak and turbulent democratic period of the 1920s, Croatian nationalists struggled against Greater-Serbian policies, and even though they were not very successful, they did succeed in a mass mobilization of Croatians. King Alexander sought to settle the crisis by abolishing democracy and introducing an authoritarian regime in 1921.[6] As a reaction against this policy, the demand for Croatian independence became stronger, especially among right-wing politicians, and received support from Germany.

After the occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Adolf Hitler created a Croatian state ruled by a puppet government composed of admirers of the Nazi regime. Cruel persecution of all non-Croatians, above all Serbs, provoked a strong reaction on the Serbian side, above all among partisans under the leadership of Josip Broz-Tito.[7] After their victory in 1945, Croatia, with its historical borders, became an autonomous republic within the new federal state of Yugoslavia.

The Serbians

By the eighteenth century all that remained of the medieval Kingdom of Serbia, which had been destroyed by Ottoman invasion, was the autonomous Orthodox Patriarchate. This provided a source of cultural identity for a rural population organized as patriarchal families and clan lineages. Serbians had openly resisted Ottoman rule several times from the sixteenth century. Most important was the uprising linked to the conquest of southern Hungary by Habsburg armies at the end of the seventeenth century.

Meanwhile the Ottoman authorities persecuted Serbians, but there were limits to how far this could go. During the time of reforms introduced during the 1790s by Sultan Selim III, Serbians, especially in the district of Belgrade, exploited tensions between the sultan and janissaries (a special military force) to prepare an insurrection. This broke out in 1804 and continued until 1812, thanks largely to Russian support. This was followed by further unrest until—around the same time as Greek independence was declared—in 1830 Serbians achieved autonomous status as a principality. This was only the first step towards a modern Serbian nation, since three important obstacles remained. First, only about 20 per cent of Serbians lived in the territory of the principality. Second, its traditional patriarchal society lacked a nobility and middle class and was subject to the

power of the Orthodox Church. Third, the new state elite lacked modern political education and only slowly and unwillingly accepted elements of civil rights and constitutionalism.

(p. 187) The most striking feature of the Serbian national movement was the territorial division between its political and cultural wings. The Serbian cultural revival began not in the principality but in southern Hungary (later named the Vojvodina), led by Serbians with higher levels of modern economic development and education than their counterparts in the principality. The interest in national emancipation motivated a group of Serbian merchants and educated men to establish in 1826 *Matica Srpska*, an institution that provided financial support for cultural activities. Serbian books were mainly published in Vienna and Pest. During the 1848 revolution, the Serbians in southern Hungary formed a powerful opposition to both Habsburg centralism and Magyarization.

Only gradually did educated elites take shape in Serbia, mostly coming from outside the principality. Serious constitutionalism began with the constitution of 1869, which was introduced shortly after the country achieved full independence. The internal political life of this state (which became a kingdom in 1882) was frequently punctuated by coups and violence. Nevertheless, it was during the 1840s and 1850s that the modern concept of the Serbian nation was born. Rejecting Illyrism as a tactical manoeuvre by the Habsburgs, the first generation of educated Serbians defined their nation by two criteria that were not fully compatible: Orthodox religion and the Serb language. The problem of sharing a written language with the majority of Croatians was partially solved by stipulating that the constructed ‘Serbo-Croat’ language be written by Catholic Croatians in the Latin alphabet and by Orthodox Serbians in the Cyrillic alphabet.

It was with this confusing combination of religious and linguistic criteria that the Greater-Serbian concept was formulated as the ideological basis for the Serbian state policy of bringing all Serbians into one nation state. Muslims in Bosnia were regarded as Islamized Serbians because they spoke što dialect. In the most extreme version of the Greater-Serbian idea Croatians who spoke što dialects were also regarded as Catholic Serbs. Thus all Bosnia was considered to belong to Serbia, and the Austrian occupation of this region in 1878 was rejected as an act of aggression against the Serbian nation. The struggle for a Serbian nation state had taken on the character of a ‘unification nationalism’ in the name of the Greater-Serbian idea. The success enjoyed by this idea after the First World War was, especially due to conflict with Croatian nationalism, the reason for much of the instability in the newly created multinational state of Yugoslavia.

The Montenegrins

The small mountainous territory called Montenegro was the one region in the Balkans that was never fully brought under the Ottoman yoke. Living in a traditional patriarchal society, its inhabitants had developed over several centuries a strong sense of identity based on clan lineages. The country was ruled by princes together with the heads of the various clans. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Montenegro (p. 188) became de facto an independent state with support from Russia. During the 1850s Montenegrins successfully resisted Ottoman attacks and in 1860 obtained an agreement guaranteeing their borders. This was the first step towards international recognition agreed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. At the same time, Montenegro enlarged its territory and achieved access to the Adriatic.

During the 1870s the absolutist princes of Montenegro initiated important reforms. The administration was improved and a few dozen elementary schools were founded as well as two high schools. The first newspapers were also published.

In the settlement following the First World War Montenegro was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenes, and its were inhabitants treated as a specific part of the Serbian nation. Nevertheless, Montenegrins preserved some important elements of their national identity, based on common memory and geographical exclusivity and, after 1945, achieved the status of an autonomous republic.

The Greeks

The Greek national movement was the only one in the Balkans that could build on cultural and linguistic continuity since the medieval period. Ottoman conquest had destroyed the Byzantine Empire but the Ottomans tolerated the Greek Orthodox Church (which used Greek as its language) and Greek literature. A group of Greek merchants and aristocrats survived, above all in Constantinople, and became the core of a rich and powerful class of ‘Phanariots’, who played an important role in running Ottoman foreign policy as well as naval, trade, and financial affairs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Phanariot class cooperated closely with the Greek Orthodox hierarchy to maintain a Byzantine-Greek identity. In the eighteenth century their cultural ambitions extended to cultivating the Greek language as the lingua franca for all Christians in the Balkans.

From the eighteenth century an expanding Greek diaspora lived in Russia and central and western Europe, maintaining contacts with each other and with Greek centres in the Ottoman Empire. This enabled the diffusion of enlightenment ideas into the Balkans. A younger generation of Greeks took up the ideas of humanity and constitutionalism, and even the principles of the French Revolution with its civic concept of the nation defined by common language and the equality of all citizens. As a consequence there developed two competing views of the Greek future based on different concepts of Greek national identity. The Phanariots considered themselves as representatives and future rulers of the nation. Enlightenment intellectuals envisaged the creation of a nation state bringing

together all ethnic Greeks. They grounded this idea in a view of the Greek past inspired by western humanist philologists and other scholars, an idealized image of ancient Greece as the motherland of democracy.

Both national movements gave priority to political goals but differed in their social programmes and their view of political power. Significant also was the difference in the (p. 189) linguistic programme. Whereas the Phanariots favoured the modernized written Greek (*kathareusa*), which non-educated people could not understand, the democrats formulated a linguistic norm based on the spoken language (*dimotiki*).

Anti-Ottoman feeling grew in all classes of society during the Napoleonic Wars. Greeks were resentful of Ottoman repression, inspired by the Serbian uprising and encouraged by the support Russia gave to the Serbians. Leading Phanariots and local Greek oppositional groups discussed the possibility of an armed rising against Ottoman rule. The Phanariot aristocracy under the leadership of Alexander Ypsilanti, who was a principal figure in the Russian diaspora, prepared a military campaign directed at the Danubian principalities. The other centre was organized by urban middle-class groups in the Greek peninsula, in contact with small rebellious peasant groups, above all in the Peloponnese.

While the Ypsilanti campaign failed and was defeated by the summer of 1821, the insurgency in the Peloponnese enjoyed great success, taking control of all the peninsula and penetrating into central Greece. Many volunteers from other parts of Greece came to fight against the Ottomans. In December 1821 an assembly of national representatives met and agreed a liberal constitution, inspired by the French constitution of 1795.

The Ottoman regime had been taken by surprise. After a period of confusion, Ottoman forces launched a successful offensive against the uprising. The decisive act was military intervention in favour of the Greek insurgents: a joint French and British fleet defeated the Ottoman navy in 1827 near the Peloponnesian coast. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in spring 1828. Thus the new Greek nation state was created under the joint protection of three of the four European powers (Austria alone remained aloof) in the years 1828–30.

This nation state, however, did not correspond to the expectations of Greek liberal nationalists as it included only a small part of ethnic Greek territory and was turned into an autocratic monarchy under the rule of King Otto, a member of a cadet branch of the Wittelsbach (Bavarian) dynasty. The struggle for constitutional government and the liberation of all Greeks from Ottoman rule continued throughout the nineteenth century until 1914. Leading Greek politicians aimed at a unification of all Greek-inhabited territories, including parts of the western coast of Asia Minor. The most radical form of this nationalism also claimed the historical capital of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople.

The Romanians

The term Romanian[8] did not exist in the early modern period. The formation of a Romanian national movement proceeded in different ways in the territory of three political units. In the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia almost all the population, including the aristocracy, were Romanian speakers, whereas in Transylvania, Romanian-speaking peasants were a subordinate ethnic group under the rule of (p. 190) Magyar-speaking nobles. Romanians also had their separate religion divided into the two confessions of Greek Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism (also known as the Uniates, this breakaway Church maintained an Orthodox ritual but acknowledged the leadership of Rome).

The first studies of the Romanian language and history were undertaken in Transylvania in the last decades of the eighteenth century by what is known as the 'Transylvanian school', who were mainly Uniates. These scholars identified the Romanian language as 'Latinist' and sought to purify it by removing non-Latin (in other words, Slavic and Greek) elements. The first steps towards linguistic emancipation were also taken in the principalities, even though the *boyar* (nobility) Academy in Bucharest continued to use Greek. While the cultural definition and project of the Romanian nation was constructed in Transylvania, the political programme of unification developed in the principalities.

Wallachia and Moldavia were semi-independent principalities, ruled by Greek Phanariots under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. The struggle for emancipation was led by the nobility (*boyars*), who regarded themselves as a 'nation' in the sense of a privileged elite, similar to the view taken by Magyar nobles. Opposition by boyars in 1821 supported the idea of a general upheaval of all Balkan Christians, led by the Greek Prince Ypsilanti. Their goal was not a civic nation but an independent state-nation ruled by the Estates, meaning the nobility.

Consequently, the national movement in the principalities focused on political aims and managed to increase their autonomy in 1831–2. Inspired by French revolutionary ideas, radical patriots in Wallachia advocated social reforms in 1848, but the revolutionary movement was unable to withstand Russian occupation. What survived was the programme of unifying the two principalities, which was supported by the more conservative Moldavian liberals. This unification was inspired by the historical tradition of 'Latinism', and its form was envisaged as a liberal state ruled by a younger generation of boyars.

With the end of Ottoman domination, the political elite of both states divided into pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. The most important cultural and to some extent also political support came from France, which was regarded by pro-Western intellectuals as their most important ally. This was more the case in Wallachia; in Moldavia the Russian influence was stronger. The crisis during the Crimean War (1853–6), when the principalities were occupied by Austria, strengthened the unification programme in both

principalities. The first step was taken under Alexandru Ion Cuza in 1859, when conservatives accepted the liberal idea of a national state, although without any important social reforms that would damage their interests. The newly established nation state took the form of a monarchy—Romania—under the rule of kings drawn from a branch of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Only after unification, and especially from the 1880s, did there begin a process of national mobilization from above, accompanied by political emancipation and liberalization.

By contrast national mobilization in Transylvania began as a movement for linguistic goals, since the Orthodox and Uniates found a common identity as ethnic 'Vlachs'. (p. 191) A petition of 1792 to the Magyar-dominated Transylvanian Diet demanded the use of the Romanian language in the Diet as well as representation of Romanian interests. An effective national agitation did not start before the 1830s. The first signs of its success came during the revolution of 1848, when Romanian political leaders opposed the Magyar concept that treated them as members of a unified Hungarian political nation. However, the movement only achieved mass mobilization in the constitutional era from the 1860s. The political programme of the national movement adopted the idea of unification with the existing Romanian nation state. This goal was finally realized following the defeat and collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918.

The Bulgarians

After the Ottoman conquest in the late fourteenth century, nothing survived of the medieval Bulgarian state. The Orthodox Church used the Greek language, and merchants, though ethnic Bulgarians, used Greek as their language of communication and education. Some scholar-clergymen 'discovered' around 1800 the glorious past of the Bulgarian state and reflected upon the ethnic specificity of the population. Some Russian and Austrian scholars also contributed to studies of the Bulgarian language, history, and ethnography.

The first expressions of Bulgarian identity were linked to Church organization and activity. From about 1830, some clergymen, Bulgarian by origin, requested permission from the Ottoman administration to use the Church Slavonic language in services and to have their own Church organization. Small concessions were made, such as introducing the Bulgarian language into elementary schools. In 1840 there existed twenty elementary schools and one high school using Bulgarian as the language of education.

In order to use Bulgarian in schools and to print and publish Bulgarian texts, it was necessary to codify the language. However, it took some decades before writing in various dialects could be replaced by one standard norm. Almost all books published in the 1830s and 1840s were translations of religious texts into Bulgarian. The first journals

appeared in 1840s. Tellingly, books were published outside Bulgaria, in Constantinople, Pest, and Vienna.

The successful struggle for Church autonomy developed in the 1850s into a movement for Bulgarian national revival. Young intellectuals, most of them educated in Russia or Austria and living outside the Ottoman Empire, argued that the national movement should be secular, based less on a confessional and more on an ethnic concept of the Bulgarian nation. During the 1860s a secular Bulgarian literature appeared in the forms of poetry, novels, and educational books. In 1869 the Bulgarian Literary Society was founded.

Moderate patriots wished to come to some arrangement with the Ottoman Empire, but radicals set up a 'Bulgarian government' sitting in Belgrade (later in Bucharest) and tried —inspired by Garibaldi's success in Italy—to unleash popular uprisings against (p. 192) Ottoman rule. When these attempts totally failed, the protagonists came to the view that they must make the national idea attractive not only to peasants but also to craftsmen and wealthy merchants in the towns, and also must wait for a favorable situation. Erroneously, they thought such a moment had come in 1875 and they initiated an insurrection. This was defeated but the Ottoman repression that followed provoked, in 1877, a new upheaval, this time supported by a large part of the population. However, the decisive force in the conflict was the Russian tsar who dispatched a strong army to the Balkans and forced the Ottoman Empire to capitulate.

The decision made by the major powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 did not satisfy the original goals of the Bulgarian movement. Yet this partial success prepared the way for a unification of almost all ethnic Bulgarian territory. The new state was established in 1879 as a constitutional monarchy with guaranteed civil rights. However, it had much to do to build up its educational system and state administration, helped above all by Austria.

The Macedonians

The ancient name 'Macedonia' disappeared during the period of Ottoman rule and was only restored in the nineteenth century, originally as a geographical term designating a vast territory between the towns of Salonika and Skopje. The urban population of this territory was Greek Slavic and Turkish speaking, along with many Albanians in the west. The question of national identity became relevant only in the 1870, when the Bulgarian national movement claimed all Slavic territories in the western part of the Balkans. However, Macedonian territory remained under Ottoman rule and the Slavic inhabitants were mobilized both by local intelligentsia and by agents coming from Bulgaria for the liberation of Macedonia. This movement expressed a dual sense of identity, demanding unification with Bulgaria while also advocating a regional Macedonian identity. By 1900 some intellectuals had formulated the concept of a Macedonian nation, based on

linguistic differences from Bulgarian as well as specific historical developments and geographical location. This concept was rejected by Bulgarian nationalists who considered Macedonians to be part of their nation, and also by Greek nationalists who regarded all Macedonia as ancient Greek territory that had to be united with the rest of Greece. In 1918 Macedonia was occupied by Serbia, which justified this by claiming that Macedonians were really Serbs speaking a different dialect.

The situation changed with the formation of an anti-German resistance during the Second World War. Macedonian partisans played an active role in this, which in turn influenced the decision to create an autonomous republic of Macedonia within the new post-war state of Yugoslavia. As a result of this, language, culture, and science were cultivated as expressions of Macedonian national identity, which was accepted by most Slavic speakers in this territory.

(p. 193) The Albanians

The Albanian national movement began very late, even though Albanians (calling themselves *shquiptare*) had been recognized as a distinct ethnic group since the early medieval period, living under the rule of various governments. Their resistance to Ottoman expansion was only temporarily successful in the fifteenth century. In the following centuries, a majority of Albanians became Muslims.

In the nineteenth century only a very few educated Albanians showed any interest in notions of an Albanian identity or culture. The first signs of a national movement came with war in the Balkans in 1878 when some of these people founded the Prizren League, which proclaimed political and cultural goals. The movement had only limited success with its attempts at promoting Albanian culture, above all in the written language and education. The League was banned and persecuted by the Ottoman government in 1881 and again in 1897. Nevertheless, the national movement survived, in part due to support from Albanians abroad and the Albanian colony in Constantinople. Its liberal leaders hoped to gain an advantage by supporting the Young Turks movement, but in this they were disappointed. In 1908 they came to an agreement on using the Latin alphabet (instead of Arabic or Greek) for written Albanian. They were, however, unable to unify the two variants of literary language, which corresponded to the two main dialects.

During the first year of the Balkan Wars (1912–13), Albanians exploited the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and declared an independent state in November 1912. This was recognized by the major powers in the following year. After the turmoil of World War I, during which Albanians had lived under various occupying armies, independence was restored in 1920. This new state included only about half of the Albanian speakers of the Balkans, the other half becoming minorities in Yugoslavia and Greece. It is difficult to consider Albania as a nation state at this time, as it was governed by a semi-feudal aristocracy of landowning *beys* who successfully suppressed attempts by liberals to

introduce constitutional government and civil rights. Instead, with Yugoslav and later Italian support, a dictatorship under King Zog was established in 1928. Only after 1945 was Albanian national identity able to spread both in Communist Albania and in Kosovo, despite differences of dialect and religion.

The Muslims/Bosniaks

The emergence of a ‘Muslim nation’ in Bosnia is linked to one of the most recent national movements to form in Europe. Its historical background is usually taken to be the Slavic Kingdom of Bosnia, which emerged in the medieval period on the margins of the Western Church but also with some degree of Orthodox infiltration from the east. (p. 194) Its geographic location and low level of state power allowed the heretic *Bogomils*, who had been expelled from the Byzantine Empire, to settle down and even to win over a sizeable portion of the local population to their faith. They created a specific ‘Bosnian Church’ and resisted persecutions and even crusades organized from Hungary. The Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in the late fourteenth century altered the religious situation. Eventually a strong Slavic-speaking Muslim community formed, whose members were privileged and played an important role in the economic and military life of the empire. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Christians in Bosnia were differentiated according to confession.

The renewed Christian resistance of the nineteenth century was inspired by the successes enjoyed by national movements in Serbia and Montenegro. They culminated in the uprising of 1875, which in turn helped bring about what is often referred to as the Near Eastern crisis. The rising was defeated, but Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and governed directly from Vienna until the outbreak of war in 1914.

While Bosnian Serbs opposed the Habsburg occupation and demanded unification with Serbia, many Croatians became effective collaborators of Vienna, playing a part in modernizing the school system, roads, and the administration. In an effort to divide the opposition, Austria supported the concept of Bosnian identity and the idea that the Muslim ‘Bosniaks’ were a specific ethnic group. After 1918, when Bosnia was incorporated into Yugoslavia, the Muslims were defined only as a religious community. During the German occupation in the 1940s, many Muslims were active in the partisan resistance and were subject to brutal treatment by the occupiers. After 1945, Bosnia became a republic within the federal state of Yugoslavia, inhabited by Muslims, Croatians, and Serbians. Muslims were granted official recognition as a national group only as late as 1968.

Conclusion

All these national movements that originated in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires share one important feature. Sooner or later, the efforts of a small group of ‘nationalists’ to cultivate a distinct sense of national identity reached the stage of mobilizing mass support. Even though only some of these movements initially aimed at independent statehood, the trend in this direction steadily increased so that, by the end of the twentieth century, all of them had attained their nation state. On the path towards autonomy or statehood, the leadership of national movements had to confront the problem of overlapping political and ethnic borders. In some cases the political border divided a homogeneous ethnic territory (Slovenes, Serbs). In other instances historic borders included members of different ethnic groups (Serbs and Croatians, Germans and Czechs). In almost all cases, there existed a tension, even a contradiction, between earlier ethnic borders and current political ones, whether real or imagined in collective (p. 195) memory. It was difficult, if not impossible, to find solutions where borders would satisfy all national claims. Consequently, the path towards nationally defined autonomous territories was always accompanied by the formation of ethnic minorities. Once nation states were established, issues of minority status and minority rights created serious problems both within states and frequently in international relations.

Can we identify general reasons or preconditions for this successful path from national agitation to mass movement and later on, to autonomy or independence? We cannot explain this solely in terms of the enthusiasm of a small number of activists or the sheer appeal of national ideas to the broader population. If we inquire into the circumstances that were favourable for national mobilization, we discover that national agitation started soon after or in the midst of deep internal conflicts in both empires. These were above all related to the modernizing reform projects of Joseph II and Selim III in the late eighteenth century. Before this there was a ‘Phase A’ of the national movements, which was an elite and scholarly project to define and elaborate a concept of national identity, above all based on ethnicity.[9] This phase was stronger in the Habsburg monarchy, and weaker in the Ottoman Empire. The degree to which this idea of a new national identity spread depended on the level of social communication and on the ability of the broader population, conditioned by the degree of formal education, to understand and internalize new ideas about a community based on equality and solidarity. Last but not least, the acceptance of national appeals was stronger where the idea of national solidarity could be linked to a community of interests, above all economic and social, but also political. Only when we have identified these various conditions can we make sense of differences in timing and intensity of the different national movements.

The chronology and structure of the process of national emancipation differed a good deal. Some national movements started at the end of the eighteenth century (Magyars, Czechs, Greeks, Serbians); some of them in the first half of the nineteenth century (Slovaks, Slovenes); some later (Albanians, Bosnian Muslims). This corresponds to the

asynchronous development of coherence within those ethnic groups which became objects of national agitation. To use the terms of Anthony Smith, some of them had already become ‘ethnic communities’ by 1800 (Magyars, Czechs, Greeks), whereas others were still at the level of ‘ethnic categories’ (Slovaks, Slovenes, Bulgarians).[10] However, the fact that some movements (Greek, Serbian, but also Romanian, Bulgarian, Magyar) achieved statehood early, and others much later, cannot be explained either in terms of the different times they began or by differences in level of education or degrees of economic backwardness.

These different paths to statehood correspond to the differences in the structure of national programmes. Some national movements began with linguistic and cultural goals, and even later when they developed a political program that did not include independence. Other movements emphasized political objectives very early in their development and soon came to demand an independent state. The first type of national programme was found principally within national movements in the Habsburg Empire (with the major exception of the Magyars). The second type characterized the (p. 196) movements within the Ottoman Empire. In other words, secessionist nationalism was decisive in national movements under Ottoman rule, whereas under Habsburg rule secessionism dominated only in the Magyar case.

How can we explain this difference? First, we must recall the differences in the political systems and political culture of the two empires, which were considered in the introduction. Second, we must analyse the social structure of national movements. Where the ethnic group as ‘nation-to-be’ included all social classes corresponding to the given level of economic development (as was the case with the Greeks, Magyars, and Serbians), national movements demanded statehood almost from their start. By contrast, where a subordinate ethnic group lacked a full social structure, especially a ruling class (bourgeoisie, nobility), national movements formulated political goals only later, and these usually took the form of demands for autonomy, not full independence.

Seen within a European context, the national movements in the Ottoman Empire appear as one specific type of secessionist nationalism, often using force and with an important role played by religious claims. By contrast, national movements in the Habsburg Empire were so diverse that it is impossible to see them as representing one specific type. Here we find the various kinds of national programmes and ‘nationalisms’ that also developed elsewhere in Europe. The unification nationalisms of the Poles and Germans have their parallels in Italy.[11] The secessionist nationalism of the Magyars has its counterparts not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in Norway, Ireland, and Belgium, as well as in Polish areas under Russian rule.

As for ‘cultural nationalism’, one can distinguish two forms. First, there were the movements that used national history to construct a political argument, such as those of the Czechs and Croatians. They are similar to movements in Catalonia, Wales, and Flanders. Then there were movements that did not employ historical arguments, such as

the Slovaks and Slovenes. In this respect, these resemble national movements in Finland, Estonia, and Latvia.

Finally, the fact that these national movements also went on to achieve their own nation states was not the result of their long-term aims but instead a consequence of the sudden collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, and the final breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War, and of the post-war decisions made by the triumphant powers of Britain, France, and the USA.

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Notes:

(1) See above, Chapter 8, on nationalism and unification in Europe.

(2) The term ‘Ruthene’ applies to eastern Slavic-speaking people in Eastern Galicia. During the nineteenth century the national identity of Ruthenes came to be closely associated with the more distinctive and larger group of Ukrainians inhabiting territory in the Russian Empire.

(3) The name ‘Matice’ means in Serbian ‘mother’ and was borrowed from Matica Srbska, which, founded in 1826, was the central cultural institution of the Serbian national movement in Hungary. Similar cultural institutions were founded with this name in other Slavic national movements.

(4) This was part of a general programme of ‘national self-determination’, expressed for example in the ‘Fourteen Points’ drawn up before the end of the war by US President Woodrow Wilson, and envisaged as the basis for the post-war order in place of the defeated empires.

(5) ‘Les Provinces Illyriennes’ included not only the territory of Slovene speakers but also Croatia, Istria, and Dalmatia. This was a formally independent state unit, although decisive executive power was held by French officials. Some elements of this administrative system survived the fall of Napoleon.

(6) It was with his assumption of power that the new name of Yugoslavia was adopted for the state.

(7) This partisan movement was not the only resistance to fascism and was not confined to Serbians. Indeed, Tito himself was Croatian.

(8) There have been two spellings of this word in English: Romanian and Rumanian. The established spelling is now Romanian, and that of the name of the country and state Romania.

(9) For the idea of phases A, B, and C in the development of national movements, see M. Hroch (ed.) (2007) ‘Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation’, *Comparative Studies in Modern European History*, London, part VII, 95.

(10) See A. D. Smith (1991) *National Identity*, Harmondsworth.

(11) The Polish and German national movements have a Habsburg component although they are mainly located in other states. They and the Italian movement are considered in the previous chapter.

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